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The European Economic Area
Agreement: Its Compatibility with the
Community Legal Order
By MARY FRANCES DOMINICK*
The Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), was
signed by twenty-one contracting parties on May 2, 1992, in Oporto,
Portugal.' Those parties included the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),2 the
twelve member states of the European Communities, 3 and the seven
member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).' Ar-
ticle 129 of the Agreement provides that it "shall be ratified or ap-
proved by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective
constitutional requirements,"5 and that it "shall enter into force on 1
January 1993, provided that all Contracting Parties have deposited
their instruments of ratification or approval before that date."6 After
that date the Agreement "shall enter into force on the first day of the
second month following the last notification. The final date for such a
notification shall be 30 June 1993."7 Ratification or other approvals
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University, J.S.D
Candidate, Columbia Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges comments by Dr.
Bernhard Schloh and Dr. Eberhard Rhein and encouragement from George Bermann, Dr.
Rudolf Bernhardt, Bernard Paulin, and Oscar Schachter. This article was presented in
March 1993 at the Hastings International and Comparative Law Review's Eleventh An-
nual Symposium on International Legal Practice, "The European Community in Evolu-
tion: Toward a Closer Political & Economic Union."
1. For the text of the 800-page Agreement, with Protocols and Annexes, see Agree-
ment on the European Economic Area, May 2, 1992, [hereinafter EEA Agreement].
2. The EEA Agreement is a so-called "mixed agreement" See ESSAYS IN EURO-
PEAN LAW AND INTEGRATION: To MARK THE SILVER JUBILEE OF THE EUROPA INSTITUTE,
LEmEN, 1957-82 (David O'Keeffe & Henry G. Schermers eds., 1982).
3. The member states of the European Community include: Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
and the United Kingdom.
4. The EFTA member states are: Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway,
Sweden, and Switzerland.
5. EEA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 129(2).
6. Id.
7. Id. art. 129(3).
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are to be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council of the
European Communities.
In a December 6, 1992 referendum, the citizens of Switzerland
vetoed their government's ratification of the Agreement by a large
cantonal majority but by a close popular vote of 50.3 percent to 49.7
percent.8 As a result, the EEA did not enter into force on January 1,
1993, and it is unlikely to go into force before the June 30, 1993 dead-
line. The remaining EFTA members vowed to move forward with
new negotiations without Swiss participation, and on March 9, 1993,
the EEA Legal Experts Working Party finalized an amended text for
signature on March 17, 1993.9
Despite these recent developments in the negotiations, a survey
of the progress toward enactment of the EEA is in order because of
its widespread support throughout the EEC and within the vast ma-
jority of the EFTA states. Some form of the EEA will inevitably be
adopted in the future.
On October 28, 1992, the European Parliament gave its formal
assent to the negotiated text, pursuant to article 238 of the EEC
Treaty. The Parliament had already expressed its support for the crea-
tion of the EEA in various resolutions;10 moreover, it had stated its
concern that the European Court of Justice (E.C.J.) had voiced consti-
tutional objections to the EEA, highlighting the Agreement's incom-
patibility with the EEC Treaty." The Commission requested the
E.C.J. to issue two advisory opinions on the EEA pursuant to article
228 of the EEC Treaty;12 the first advisory opinion resulted in a find-
8. Allen Riding, Swiss Reject Tie to Wider Europe, N.Y. TIMIs, Dec. 7, 1992, at A7.
9. EUR. COUNCIL, Doc. No. 5124, at 93 (Mar. 7, 1993).
10. Decision on the Conclusion of the Agreement on the European Economic Area,
1992 O.J. (C 305) 66 (Oct. 28,1992). Article 238 of the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EURO.
PEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, [EEC TREATY] provides that the Council of the Commu-
nity may conclude "with a third state, a union of States or an international organization
agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations; common
action and special procedures." The Council must act unanimously after receiving the as-
sent of an absolute majority of the European Parliament. Agreements are negotiated by
the Commission pursuant to article 228(1).
11. Resolution on the European Economic Area, 1992 O.J. (C 67) 196; Resolution on
the European Economic Area, 1991 O.J. (C 183) 366; Resolution on the negotiations be-
tween the Community and the EFTA countries on the creation of the European Economic
Area, 1991 O.J. (C 106) 123; Resolution on relations between the EEC and EFTA, 1990
O.J. (C 113) 172; Resolution on the relations between the European Community and the
EFTA states, 1990 O.J. (C 15) 336.
12. EEC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 228 states: "The Council, the Commission or a
Member State may obtain beforehand the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an
agreement envisaged is compatible with the provisions of this Treaty. Where the opinion
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ing of conflict with the EEC Treaty, 13 but the second concluded that
the constitutional defects had been remedied by further
negotiations.'4
These two advisory opinions will be the main focus of this Article.
Not only are they instructive on specifics of the EEA, but they also
provide commentary on the constitutional structure of the Commu-
nity. Before examining them in detail, however, it is useful to con-
sider a brief history of the free trade agreements between the EFTA
states and the EEC and ECSC, as well as an overview of the EEA
Agreement itself.
I. THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
Separate free trade agreements between the EEC and the indi-
vidual EFTA states and between the ECSC and the individual EFTA
states were signed in July 1972, and in May and October 1973.15 To-
gether these agreements then composed the largest free trade area in
the world for industrial goods, serving a population of 380 million
people from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea. The agree-
ments followed the accession of Denmark, the United Kingdom, and
Ireland to the European Communities, both Denmark and the United
Kingdom having been original signatories to the 1960 Convention es-
tablishing EFTA.16 EFTA was the compromise or counterpart to the
EEC by some of the remaining members of the Organization for Eu-
ropean Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which was founded by Aus-
of the Court of Justice is adverse, the Agreement may enter into force only in accordance
with Article 236."
13. Opinion 1/91, Re the Draft Treaty Relating to the Creation of the European Eco-
nomic Area, 1991 OJ. (C 110) 1 [hereinafter Opinion 191].
14. Opinion 1192, Re the Draft Treaty Relating to the Creation of the European Eco-
nomic Area, 1992 OJ. (C 136) 1 [hereinafter Opinion 1/92].
15. Liechtenstein was at that time an associate member through Switzerland, so there
were only six members of EFTA. For the texts of the free trade agreements [hereinafter
Free Trade Agreements], see: Agreement between the European Economic Community
and the Republic of Austria, 1972 J.O. (L 300) 2; Agreement between the European Eco-
nomic Community and the Portuguese Republic, 1972 J.0. (L 301) 165 (lapsed since Portu-
guese accession to the Community); Agreement between the European Economic
community and the Swiss Republic, 1972 J.0. (L 300) 189; Agreement between the Euro-
pean Economic Community and the Republic of Finland, 1973 .O. (L 328) 2; Agreement
between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway, 1973 3.O. (L
171) 2 (signed after accession to the Community failed by referendum in Norway); Agree-
ment between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland, 1972 J.0.
(L 301) 2.
16. TREATY ESTABLisHiNG THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION [EFTA
TREATY].
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tria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, and the United Kingdom on April 16,1948.17 The estab-
lishment of the OEEC fulfilled the Marshall Plan's requirement that a
common economic recovery plan be established."' It is well known
that the six original members of the European Communities
(Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Germany, and Italy)
sought a more extensive form of cooperation based on a customs
union rather than a free trade area, and, therefore, concluded the
treaties establishing the EEC and Euratom in Rome, on March 25,
1957. These same members had already formed the union limited to
coal and steel on April 18, 1951..
The accession treaties signed by Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and
the United Kingdom on January 22, 1972, were followed six months
later by the first free trade agreements with Austria, Iceland, Portugal,
Sweden, and Switzerland.19 Upon failure of its populace to accept ac-
cession to the European Communities in a referendum held in 1972,
the Norwegian government initiated a free-trade agreement signed on
May 14, 1973.20 The Finnish government signed a free trade agree-
ment with the Communities on October 5, 1973.21
The agreements were virtually identical plans to reduce import
duties on industrial goods. By January 1, 1984, tariffs and quantitative
restrictions on all but a few sensitive products were abolished; thus,
the ministers from the EC and EFTA member states declared in Lux-
embourg, on April 9, 1984, that further cooperation would be in
order.22
The free trade agreements had been what one European scholar
called "the lowest common denominator between the positions of the
various EFTA countries." 23 Sweden, he explains, proposed a customs
17. See generally U.K. Paymaster General Report to Parliament, Negotiations for a
European Free Trade Area: Report on the Course of Negotiations up to December 1958
(London, 1959).
18. Id.
19. Free Trade Agreements, supra note 15.
20. Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of
Norway, supra note 15.
21. Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the Republic of
Finland, supra note 15. See Edmond Wellenstein, The Relations between the European
Communities and Finland, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 713 (1983).
22. Ministerial Meeting between EFTA Countries and the EC and Its Member States,
EFTA BuLL. Apr.-Jun. 1984, at 6-7.
23. Ulf Bernitz, The EEC-EFTA Free Trade Agreements with Special Reference to the
Position of Sweden and the Other Scandinavian EFTA Countries, 23 COMMON MKT. L.
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union rather than a free-trade zone, which was to have been accompa-
nied by judicial or arbitral dispute resolution mechanisms, while F'm-
land felt that a free-trade area for industrial goods alone was all that
was politically feasible.24 The compromise dispute resolution mecha-nism was a weak Joint Committee, "a diplomatic body and not a judi-
cial organ."5 (The fact that the European Communities opposed a
judicial or arbitral system connected with the E.CJ. is relevant to the
two opinions of the European Court considered in the next section of
this Article.) As Professor Ulf Bernitz comments, "The undeveloped
and primitive nature of the Free Trade Agreements from an adjudica-
tory viewpoint is striking, and hardly in line with European legal cul-
ture of today to exclude any kind of judicial system for the resolution
of disputes in international agreements of this magnitude."
2 6
The legal effect of the free trade agreements within the European
Communities and EFTA states has also been a matter of discussion.
Under a line of cases decided by the E.C.J. beginning with Kupferberg
I,2 7 the doctrine of direct effect was applied to international agree-
ments where provisions are found to be unconditional and specific.
The result is that provisions of the free trade agreements must be ap-
plied directly by national courts of European Community member
states, and those provisions may be invoked directly by individuals
appearing in those Community courts. 8 The direct effects doctrine,
however, does not necessarily apply in EFTA state courts; that deter-
mination is dependent upon whether the EFTA state in question is a
monist or a dualist system and how it has incorporated the agreement
into its domestic legal order.
Under the monist theory governing the relationship between na-
tional and international law, to which Austria and Switzerland adhere,
ratification of a treaty or international agreement by a nation's legisla-
tive branch automatically incorporates it into that nation's domestic
REv. 567, 570 (1986). Cf. Johannson, Laccord sur L'Espace 1conomique europien est suf-
fisant, 359 Rv. MARCHt COM. 494 (1992).
24. Id. See generally Goran Lys6n, Some Views on Neutrality and Membership of the
European Communities: The Case of Sweden, 29 COMMloN MKir. L Rnv. 229 (1992); La
Demande d'Adhesion de la Suede: Un Acte Politique, 359 REv. MARCHt CONI. (Numdro
Special 1992); ANDREW EvANs & PER FALK, LAW AND INTEOPATION: SWEDEN AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1991).
25. Bernitz, supra note 23, at 570.
26. Id. at 571.
27. Case 104/81, Haupzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie, 1982 E.C.R. 3641. See
Gerhard Bebr, Agreements Concluded by te Community and Their Possible Direct Effect,
20 COMMON MKT. L. Rnv. 35 (1983).
28. Bernitz, supra note 23 at 571-78.
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legal system. Under the dualist theory, to which the Scandinavian
states adhere, treaties or international agreements must be either
transformed into domestic law by separate legislation or be incorpo-
rated by special enactment declaring their status as national law.29
Only Finland has transformed or incorporated its agreement into do-
mestic law.3 1 While treaties or agreements that have not been trans-
formed or incorporated cannot be invoked as binding before national
courts, rules of interpretation generally presume that "internal law
should be in accordance with international law as expressed in ratified
international treaties."
'31
The Joint Committees set up by the free trade agreements oper-
ate on the principle of consultation. If consultations should fail, safe-
guard measures may be taken under the agreements. This dispute
resolution mechanism does not resolve the problem of enforceability
of the free trade agreements or the EEA Agreement in the nineteen
EFTA and EC member states, nor does it address the problems of
consultation on secondary legislation promulgated by the European
Community.
H. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA AGREEMENT
The EEA Agreement is comprised of 129 articles followed by
some 600 pages containing forty-eight protocols and twenty-two an-
nexes.32 The EC Commissioner for External Affairs, Frans Andries-
sen, told the European Parliament in October 1992 that the EEA
29. Louis HENKIN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 140-41 (2d
ed. 1987). See JAMES L. BRIERLY, Tim LAW OF NATIONS 86-93 (6th ed. 1963); Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, arts. 26, 46, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 339, 345.
30. Bernitz, supra note 23, at 581. See generally Anders Nervell, The Emerging Euro-
pean Economic Space: A Proposed Legal Framework for Expanding EEC-EFTA Relations
Beyond the Free Trade Agreements, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 181, 189-95 (1990), citing N.
Wahl, The Free Trade Agreements between the EC and EFTA Countries, 44 Institutet fdr
Immaterialratt och Marknadsrdtt 1988.
31. Bernitz, supra note 23, at 579. See generally CREATING A EUROPEAN ECONOMIC-
SPACE, LEGAL ASPECrS OF EC-EFTA RELATIONS: PAPERS FROM THE DUBLIN CONFER.
ENE, OCTOBER 1989 (M. Robinson & J. Findlater eds., 1990).
32. The EEA Agreement is divided into seven parts delineated as follows: (i) Objec-
tives and Principles; (ii) Free Movement of Goods; (iii) Free Movement of Persons, Serv-
ices and Capital; (iv) Competition and Other Common Rules; (v) Horizontal Provisions
Relevant to the Four Freedoms (Social Policy, Consumer Protection, Environment, Statis-
tics and Company Law); (vi) Cooperation Outside the Four Freedoms; (vii) Institutional
Provisions; (viii) Financial Mechanisms; and (ix) General and Final Provisions.
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Agreement is "the most important treaty which the European Com-
munity has signed with third countries in its history."
33
There are many parallels between the EEC Treaty and the EEA
Agreement; in fact, in many cases the language is virtually identical,
thus ensuring uniform interpretation of the two treaties? 4 The proto-
cols address particular issues, such as "Implementation of Competi-
tion Rules Applicable to Undertakings,' 35 "Cooperation between the
Surveillance Authorities,' 36 "Cooperation in the Field of Control of
Concentrations, ' 3 1 "Intellectual Property,"38 "Cooperation in Specific
Fields outside the Four Freedoms, '39 "Possibility for Courts and
Tribunals of EFTA States to Request the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities to Decide on the Interpretation of EEA Rules cor-
responding to EC Rules,"'4 and "Statute of the EEA Joint
Parliamentary Committee."'" The annexes incorporate approxi-
mately 1,700 acts of the European Communities, referred to as the
acquis communautaire, into the EEA Agreement by specific refer-
ences to their publication in the Official Journal of the European
Communities rather than reproduction of the entire texts.42
The preamble to the EEA Agreement states that its objective is
to establish:
a dynamic and homogeneous European Economic Area, based on
common rules and equal conditions of competition and providing
for the adequate means of enforcement including at the judicial
level, and achieved on the basis of equality and reciprocity and of an
overall balance of benefits, rights and obligations for the Con-
tracting Parties.43
33. European Parliament Approves Proposed European Economic Area Treaty, BNA
INT'L Bus. DAILy, Oct. 30, 1992.
34. Sven Norberg, The Institutional Solutions Ensuring a Dynamic and Homogeneous
EEA, EFTA Bu... Jan.-Apr. 1992, at 2,3.
35. EEA Agreement, supra note 1, protocol 21.
36. Id. protocol 23.
37. Id. protocol 24.
38. Id. protocol 28.
39. Id. protocol 31.
40. Id. protocol 34.
41. Id. protocol 36. Cf. EP Resolution on the European Economic Area, 1991 0. (C
183) 336, 367.
42. See Norberg, supra note 34. The author explains that these texts will be translated
into the official language of each EFTA member state and that their total volume will be
approximately 12,000 pages.
43. EEA Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl.
1993]
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Article 1 restates this objective, calling for a "continuous and balanced
strengthening of trade and economic relations 'between the Con-
tracting Parties."" Article 6 guarantees that the provisions of the
EEA Agreement that are "identical in substance to corresponding
rules" of the EEC and ECSC Treaties, and to acts implementing them,
"shall in their implementation and application be interpreted in con-
formity with the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities given prior to the date of signature of this
Agreement."'4 Article 7 goes further, stating that acts referred to in
the annexes or in decisions of the EEA Joint Committee shall be bind-
ing and part of the internal legal order of all contracting parties, just
as under the EEC Treaty as follows:
(a) An act corresponding to an EEC regulation shall as such be
made part of the internal legal order of the Contracting Parties.
(b) An act corresponding to an EEC directive shall leave to the
authorities of the Contracting Parties the choice of form and
method of implementation.46
Article 7 is explained further in protocol 35, which provides that the
EEA will be "achieved through national procedures" rather than
"transfer [of] legislative powers to any institution of the European
Economic Area."'47 Protocol 35 tried to clarify in Draft Article 1 that
any act corresponding to an EEC directive which is "clear, precise and
unconditional" shall be treated under article 7(a) of the EEA Agree-
ment, that is, as a regulation which is directly applicable and has direct
effect.48 In the final adopted version, however, the potential conflict
between monist and dualist systems was all that was addressed by the
sole article of protocol 35 which states that, "[f]or cases of possible
conflicts between implemented EEA rules and other statutory provi-
sions, the EFTA States undertake to introduce, if necessary, a statu-
tory provision to the effect that EEA rules prevail in these cases."
'49
Under the institutional provisions of Part VII, the focus of the
two E.C.J. opinions, section 3 of the draft first considered by the
Court was the most controversial because it created an independent
EEA Court, which would have been "functionally integrated with the
44. Id. art. 1.
45. Id. art. 6.
46. Id. art. 7.
47. Id. protocol 35.
48. See Opinion 1/91, supra note 13, at C110/2.
49. EEA Agreement, supra note 1, n.35.
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Court of Justice of the European Communities." 50 As discussed be-
low, this section raised a constitutional issue for the Community,
threatening the independence of the E.C.J. and the Community legal
order as a whole. The opinions are worth scrutiny, not only because
of their observations on the functioning of the EEA Joint Commit-
tee,51 the EFrA Surveillance Authority, and the EFTA Court 3 but
also because they are instructive in other areas, such as human rights,
where an independent or even integrated judicial authority might
challenge the supremacy of the E.C.J.
III. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE ADVISORY
OPINIONS ON THE EEA AGREEMENT
The objective of the judicial system first agreed upon by the con-
tracting parties was three-fold, "[t]he settlement of disputes between
the Contracting Parties, the settlement of disputes within EFTA and
making for [sic] increased uniformity of law within the EEA ....,,4
The Commission did not foresee objections to the EEA Court, which
was to have included members of the E.C.J.; indeed, it thought that
uniformity of application of EEA rules would be guaranteed by E.C.J.
members sitting with counterparts from the EFTA member states.
The EEA Court would have been seised by the EEA Joint Commit-
tee, the political successor to the individual Joint Committees found in
the separate free trade agreements, or by any of the contracting par-
ties should the Joint Committee not be able to resolve a dispute within
a limited period of time.
Within EFTA, disputes might arise between the EFTA Surveil-
lance Authority (the complement to the EC Commission's Director-
ate General IV for Competition) and EFTA member states because of
a state's failure to fulfill its obligations under the EEA, or as an ap-
peal of the Surveillance Authority's decision in the field of state aids.
Also envisaged was an EEA Court of First Instance for competition
cases, from which appeal might also be made to the proposed EEA
Court.
50. Draft of the EEA Agreement, art. 95(1). See Opinion 1191, supra note 13, at
C110/3.
51. Draft of the EEA Agreement, supra note 50, arts. 92-94.
52. Id. art. 108(1).
53. Id. art. 108(2).
54. Opinion 1191, supra note 13, at C11016.
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A. Opinion 1191
The advantages of the proposed system, according to the Com-
mission, included the fact that the EEA Agreement would not be ap-
plied "in ignorance of Community law or of the case-law of the Court
of Justice,"' 5 that "economic agents [would] not be denied access to
judicial review by the procedure for preliminary rulings, and that the
EFTA countries [would] not be made subject to foreign judges."
56
The EC Commission was unsure of the compatibility of that system
with the EEC and the ECSC Treaties, however, and thus requested
the E.C.J.'s opinion on four points.
The first question raised before the E.C.J. concerned the partici-
pation of members of the Court of Justice in another court. This ques-
tion was raised not only in Opinion 1i76,57 but also as one of the key
objections to the European Communities adhesion to the European
Convention on Human Rights.58 The Commission argued that be-
cause the EEA Court would not have jurisdiction to render prelimi-
nary rulings on the EEA Agreement and because it would be
"functionally integrated" with the E.C.J., the EEA. Court should be
distinguished from the tribunal considered and rejected in Opinion
1/76.59
The Spanish government, which the Commission had feared
would initiate review of the EEA Agreement by the E.C.J. if the
Commission did not do so, submitted separate written observations to
the Court, as did the Belgian and British governments. The Spanish
government felt that the impartiality of E.C.J. judges would be com-
promised if they were called upon to decide an issue already deter-
mined by the EEA Court. Furthermore, it interpreted article 7 of the
EEA Agreement to read that "the EEA Court is to be an independ-
ent body and in no way subordinate to the Court of Justice." 60 The
effects of the EEA Court's judgments on the E.C.J. were left unclear.
The Belgian and British governments agreed with the Commis-
sion that the proposed EEA Court would be compatible with the
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Opinion 1/76, Re the Draft Agreement on the European Laying-up Fund for In-
land Waterway Vessels, 1977 E.C.R. 741 [hereinafter Opinion 11761.
58. See Duthiel de la Roch6re, L'Espace dconomique europden sous le regard des Juges
de la Cour de Justice des Communaut$s Europe-annes, 360 REv. MARCHP COM. 603, 608;
Mary F. Dominick, Toward a Community Bill of Rights, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 639, 645-47
(1991).
59. Opinion 1/91, supra note 13, at C1107.
60. Id.
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Community legal order, specifically with the EEC Treaty and Opinion
1/76. The United Kingdom observed that there was no conflict as de-
scribed by the Spanish government in the possibility of an E.CJ. judge
being called upon to sit in a case already determined by the EEA
Court because the authority for such a determination would derive
from different legal bases, just as the same points ruled upon in an
EEC Treaty Article 169 infringement case may be brought up in an
EEC Treaty Article 177 referral for preliminary ruling.61 In attempt-
ing to distinguish the present case from Opinion 1/76, the United
Kingdom argued unsuccessfully that the members of the EEA Court
would not be "supervising a legal regime based on principles of public
international law different from those forming the acquis
communautaire."62
The second question raised by the Commission was whether af-
fording EFTA member states the right to intervene in Community
cases pending before the E.C.J. was compatible with the EEC Treaty.
The Commission argued that the Court had already given non-mem-
ber states a right to intervene in proceedings under article 37 of its
own statute, but that "here the right would be more systematic, re-
quiring questions referred for a preliminary ruling to be notified to the
EFTA countries on the same footing as they are notified to the Mem-
ber States," (thus, requiring amendment of article 20 of the Statute of
the Court).63 The Spanish, Belgian, and British governments ob-
served that additional revisions would be necessary to extend the right
of intervention and participation to EFTA member states.
The third question raised by the Commission was whether it
would be compatible with the EEC Treaty for the E.C.J. to entertain
requests for preliminary rulings from courts in EFTA countries. Spain
argued that it was not compatible and that article 177 should apply
only to courts of the Community member states. Belgium argued that
article 177 should be amended to include references from judicial bod-
ies of non-member countries. Citing DHSS v. Barr and Montrose, 
6
the United Kingdom observed that courts located in a dependency of
a member state that are not part of that member state's court system,
but in which Community law applies, had been held to be subject to
article 177. It suggested somewhat circuitously that the proposed
EEA Agreement would be both an act of the institutions and an inter-
61. Id.
62. Id. at Cl1018.
63. Id.
64. Dept. of Health and Social Sec. (Isle of Man) v. Barr, 3 C.M.LR. 325 (1991).
1993]
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national agreement concluded under article 238 of the EEC Treaty;
thus, there could be "no objection to the Court of Justice giving pre-
liminary rulings on the interpretation of the proposed agreement.
6 5
The fourth question raised by the Commission was whether the
proposed EEA Court and EEA Court of First Instance would be per-
missible under article 238 of the EEC Treaty. If not, the Commission
felt article 238 should be amended. The Spanish government argued
firmly that article 238 does not allow incompatibility with the EEC
Treaty, something which the proposed EEA court system clearly was,
and that it must be amended before the EEA Agreement could be
concluded. The Belgian government agreed, but envisaged amend-
ments to other parts of the EEC Treaty as well as to the Statute of the
E.C.J. The United Kingdom considered article 238 of the EEC Treaty
as "appropriate to enable judicial procedures to be included in agree-
ments covered by that provision. Such procedures may even foster
the sound functioning of such agreements.
'66
In Opinion 1/91, the E.C.J. excluded consideration of the provi-
sions of the EEA Agreement dealing with the decision-making pro-
cess67 and with the competition surveillance and enforcement
mechanisms.68 The Court focused exclusively on judicial supervision
under the EEA Agreement, which included appeals from the EFTA
Surveillance Authority.
After reviewing the provisions of the EEA Agreement compris-
ing judicial supervision, 69 the European Court compared the aims of
the EEA with those of the Community.70 The Court emphasized that
although provisions may be worded identically, their objectives may
not be the same. The EEA Agreement is governed by article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states: "A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
65. Opinion 1/91, supra note 13, at C11019.
66. Id.
67. "Decision-making" refers to articles 97-104 of the EEA Agreement which seek to
ensure parallel developments in the EC and EFTA countries under the EEA Agreement.
Experts from EFTA states will be consulted by the EC Commission just as experts from
EC member states in the preparation of new legislation and rules. In addition, the EEA
Council, meeting at ministerial level, and the EEA Joint Committee, which meets at a
lower official level more often than the EEA Council, will play an information, consulta-
tion and surveillance role. They do not, however, have legislative power. See Norberg,
supra note 34, at 3-5.
68. See Rouam, L'Espace dconomique europden: Un horizon nouveau pour la politique
de concurrence?, 354 Rnv. MARCHA COM. 53 (1992).
69. Opinion 1/91, supra note 13, recitals 5-12.
70. Id. recitals 13-29.
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meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose. x71 The EEA Agreement's objec-
tives, to further free trade and competition among the contracting par-
ties, are much narrower than those of the Treaties forming the
European Communities.72 Furthermore, under the EEA Agreement,
the contracting parties do not "transfer sovereign rights to the inter-
governmental institutions which it sets up."73 Citing Van Gend en
Loos,74 the Court pointed out that the Community legal order re-
stricts member states' sovereign rights "in ever wider fields"'75 and ap-
plies not only to the states themselves, but also to their nationals. The
goal of the EC is European unity.
Article 6 of the EEA Agreement and protocol 35 will not, in the
opinion of the European Court, insure the autonomy and supremacy
of the Community legal order, nor can they "secure the objective of
homogeneity of the law throughout the EEA, either as regards the
past or for the future."76 Article 6 stipulates that EEA Agreement
provisions which correspond to EEC provisions must be interpreted in
conformity with the case law of the European Court; however, it ap-
plies only to judgments rendered prior to the signing of the EEA
Agreement. Even more importantly, it does not specify the applica-
bility of case law or the direct effect and supremacy of Community
law. Protocol 35 merely requires EFTA contracting parties to intro-
duce statutory provisions into their internal legal orders which ensure
that EEA rules prevail over contrary legislative provisions. It would
be for the EEA Court to determine "the respective competencies of
the Community and [its] Member States as regards the matters gov-
erned by the provisions of the agreement," an arrangement incompat-
ible with article 219 of the EEC Treaty and article 87 of the ECSC
Treaty.77
If an international agreement concluded by the Community
under article 228 of the EEC Treaty provides for its own system of
courts, "the decisions of that court will be binding on the Community
institutions, including the Court of Justice," whether called upon "by
71. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 29, art. 31(1).
72. In recital 17, of Opinion 1191, supra note 13, the Court cites articles 2, Sa, and 102a
of the EEC Treaty, as amended, and article 1 of the Single European Act.
73. Opinion 1191, supra note 13, recital 20.
74. Case 26/62, Van Gend En Loos v. Nederlandse Belastingadministratie, 1963
E.C.R. 1.
75. Opinion 1191, supra note 13, recital 21.
76. Id. recitals 28, 29.
77. Id. recitals 34, 35.
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way of preliminary ruling or in a direct action."78 The Court states
that such a system is "in principle compatible with Community
law.... However, the agreement at issue takes over an essential part
of the rules-including the rules of secondary legislation-which gov-
ern economic and trading relations within the Community and which
constitute, for the most part, fundamental provisions of the Commu-
nity legal order."79 Article 6 will not apply to European Court deci-
sions rendered after the date of EEA Agreement signature. For these
reasons, the Court ruled that article 164 of the EEC Treaty80 would be
violated by the EEA system of courts and "more generally ... the
very foundations of the Community. '8 1
The fact that justices of the European Court were to sit on the
proposed EEA Court did not resolve the conflicts envisaged by the
European Court because the objectives of the EEA and the EC are
different. Judges of the E.C.J. sitting on the EEA Court would have
to:
apply and interpret the same provisions but using different ap-
proaches, methods and concepts in order to take account of the na-
ture of each treaty and of its particular objectives. In those
circumstances, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for those
judges, when sitting in the Court of Justice, to tackle questions with
completely open minds where they have taken part in determining
those questions as members of the EEA Court.'
On the question of referrals to the European Court under article
104(2) of the EEA Agreement and protocol 34 interpreting it, the
Court felt that the fact that such references by EFTA member state
courts would not be mandatory was not a barrier to compatibility.
However, the fact that the E.C.J.'s responses would not be binding did
make protocol 34 incompatible with articles 177 and 228 of the EEC
Treaty.
3
The right of EFTA countries to intervene before the E.C.J. could
be accomplished under article 236 of the EEC Treaty, which permits
amendments to the Court's Statute by the Council of Ministers acting
78. Id. recital 39.
79. Id. recitals 40, 41.
80. Article 164 provides: "The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation
and application of this Treaty the law is observed." EEC TREATY, supra note 10, art. 164.
81. Opinion 1/91, supra note 13, recital 46.
82. Id. recitals 51, 52.
83. Id. recitals 58-65. The Court feared that EFTA courts may also consider decisions
rendered under EEC article 177 non-binding. Id. recital 63.
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unanimously upon request of the European Court.84 Article 238 of
the EEC Treaty does not, however, in the opinion of the European
Court, allow the establishment of a system of courts which conflicts
with article 164 of the EEC Treaty "and more generally, with the very
foundations of the Community. ''as
B. Opinion 1/92
From December 14, 1991, the date the E.C.J. delivered its first
opinion on the EEA, through February 14, 1992, the Commission and
the EFPA countries renegotiated the text of the EEA Agreement.
The EEA Agreement was resubmitted to the European Court for its
opinion on compatibility with the EEC Treaty. The European Parlia-
ment was permitted, upon its own request, to submit observations.
The renegotiated portions of text include the preamble to the
EEA Agreement, articles 56 and 64 of Part IV on "Competition and
Other Common Rules," chapter 3 of Part VII on "Institutional Provi-
sions," and protocols 33, 34, and 35. The addition to the preamble
reads as follows:
Whereas, in full deference to the independence of the Courts, the
objective of the Contracting Parties is to arrive at, and maintain, a
uniform interpretation and application of this Agreement and those
provisions of Community legislation which are substantially repro-
duced in this Agreement and to arrive at equal treatment of individ-
uals and economic operators as regards the four freedoms and the
conditions of competition .... 86
This provision was designed to underline the most basic objective of
the EEA: homogeneity. The preamble, together with article 105(1) of
the EEA Agreement, are intended to ensure this goal. Article 105
establishes a procedure to follow in monitoring the E.C.J.'s jurispru-
dence after the date of signature of the EEA Agreement and in
resolving differences between the case law of the new EFTA Court
and the E.C.J.
The EFTA countries refused to amend article 6 of the EEA
Agreement to incorporate rulings of the Court of Justice after the date
of signature, but they did agree that:
The EEA Joint Committee shall keep under constant review the
development of the case-law [sic] of the Court of Justice of the Eu-
84. Id. recitals 66-68.
85. Id. recital 71.
86. EEA Agreement, supra note 1.
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ropean Communities and the EFTA Court. To this end judgments
of these Courts shall be transmitted to the EEA Joint Committee
which shall act so as to preserve the homogeneous inlerpretation of
the Agreement. 87
Where a discrepancy cannot be resolved within two months, article
111 applies.8 8 This article empowers the EEA Joint Committee to set-
tle any dispute on interpretation .or application of the Agreement, in-
cluding unresolved differences in case law of the EC and EFTA
Courts. According to the European Court, however, article 111 is
governed by an "Agreed Minute" found in the proces-verbal which
"stipulates that in no case may Joint Committee decisions taken pur-
suant to [article 105] affect rulings of the Court of Justice. '89
The new article 106 of the EEA Agreement sets up a procedure
for exchange of information between the European Court, the EFTA
Court and EFTA member states' courts of last instance. 90 The new
article 107, together with protocol 34 implementing it, now bind the
EFTA countries by referring questions for the European Court "to
decide."'"
Article 111 establishes dispute resolution mechanisms for two
types of conflicts: first, where a provision of the EEA Agreement is
"identical in substance to corresponding provisions of Community
law" and second, where the conflict arises "from safeguard or
rebalancing measures."'  In the former case, the contracting parties
concerned may petition the European Court for a ruling:
If so, although this is not set down in the Agreement, it has been
agreed that the Commission will bring the matter before the Court
and request an Opinion under Article 228 of the EEC Treaty. If
after a certain period, the Joint Committee has not reached an
agreement, the Contracting Party which considers itself to be the
injured party may adopt either a safeguard measure or a measure
suspending the Agreement.93
87. Id. art. 105(2).
88. Id. art. 105(3).
89. Opinion 1/92, supra note 14, at C136/5 ("the Commission alo states that this will
be confirmed by a declaration to be entered in the Council minutes which will precede the
conclusion of the Agreement"); id. recital 29.
90. Id. at C136/6
91. Id.
92. Safeguard measures are found in EEA Agreement articles 111(3) and 112, and
rebalancing measures are found in article 114.
93. Regarding safeguard measures, see supra note 92; the measure suspending the
Agreement would be taken pursuant to EEA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 102(5).
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In the latter case, the measures may be referred to binding arbitration
provided that questions of interpretation of the Agreement are not
involved.94
Unlike the first Opinion, the Court's second Opinion does not
exclude issues raised by the competition provisions. The Commission
asked the Court to render its opinion on article 56 "in the light of
Articles 53 and 54 of the Agreement."' It explained that in "mixed
cases" of agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations
of undertakings where trade is affected between the Community and
EFTA member states and where theoretically both the Commission
and the EFTA Surveillance Authority could have jurisdiction, article
56(1)(c) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the EC Commission. Where
trade is between only one Community member state and one or more
EFTA states, article 53 of the EEA Agreement gives the Commission
jurisdiction, despite rules interpreting EEC Treaty Article 85 that
would deny the Commission jurisdiction:96 "This entirely new power
will be exercised by the Commission where the turnover of the under-
takings is less than 33 [percent] of their total turnover in the European
Economic Area .... ,,97
In cases of abuse of dominant position "where the dominant posi-
tion exists solely in the Community, but the abuse affects trade not
only between Member States but also between Contracting Parties,"
article 54 of the EEA Agreement allows the Commission to consider
effects on EFTA member states.98 The Commission also has jurisdic-
tion in mixed cases where both dominant position and effects occur in
both Community and EFTA member states.99
The EFTA Surveillance Authority will have jurisdiction over
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of under-
takings and concerted practices: (1) where trade affected is exclusively
between or among EFTA member states; (2) where trade between a
Community member state and one or more EFTA member states is
affected, provided that "the turnover of the undertakings concerned
in the territory of the EFTA States equals 33 [percent] or more of
94. See EEA Agreement, supra note 1, protocol 33 on Arbitration Procedures.
95. Opinion 1/92, supra note 14, at C13616.
96. Id.
97. Id. at C136/7; EEA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 56()(b).
98. Opinion 1/92, supra note 14, at C13617.
99. The Commission will act under EEA Agreement Article 86, "supplemented by
Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. This .exclusive Community jurisdiction derives from
Article 56(2) in conjunction with paragraph 1(c) of the same Article." Id.
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their turnover in the territory covered by [the EEA] Agreement;"1 ° °
and (3) where trade between Community member states is in princi-
ple affected but those effects are de minimis.11 It will have jurisdic-
tion in cases of abuse of dominant position in "pure" cases where the
dominant position and effects are solely within and between EFTA
member states and where the dominant position is within the EFTA,
but the abuse affects trade between any of the EEA contracting
parties.
The Commission explained to the E.C.J. that EEA Agreement
Article 56 transfers power neither to the EFTA Su.rveillance Author-
ity nor to the EFTA Court; it also stated that EEA Agreement Article
64 allows contracting parties to take interim measures and, if insuffi-
cient, definitive measures to offset the distorting effects of infringe-
ment of the rules on state aids.1°2
The European Parliament in its written observations regretted
that the Commission had not asked the Court to consider Parliament's
role in the decision-making process. The Parliament argued that "the
powers which the Agreement confers on it are at odds with the demo-
cratic principle set out in the preamble."'10 3 It also concluded that the
renegotiated text of the Agreement "contains such shortcomings as to
make an interpretation complying with the treaty seem extremely dif-
ficult."' 4 Parliament's specific objections were to the authority given
the Joint Committee to interpret decisions of the EC and EFTA
Courts and the reliance upon the Agreed Minute under both articles
105 and 111 of the EEA Agreement to guarantee the E.C.J.'s sole
jurisdiction to interpret Community law.
The Parliament also questioned the "procedure" for referrals to
the Court of Justice under article 228 of the EEC Treaty, noted only in
the procis-verbal. It observed in the words of the E.C.J., "that the
procedures are so complicated and the demarcation lines so vaguely
drawn that the renegotiated texts shall be revised, simply from the
point of view of legal certainty.. .. 0s
The European Court did not address these observations point by
point. Instead, it first reviewed the new provisions of the EEA Agree-
100. EEA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 56(1)(c).
101. Opinion 1/92, supra note 14, at C1367.
102. Id.
103. Id. at C136/8. See EEA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 95 (on Parliamentary Coop-
eration, establishing the Joint Parliamentary Committee). See also id. protocol 36.
104. Opinion 1/92, supra note 14, at C136/8.
105. Id.
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ment and the machinery and procedures they established. The new
provisions were then compared with the old version of the Agreement
and their compatibility with the EEC Treaty was determined. Finally,
the Court considered the competition provisions raised by the
Commission.
The EFTA Court was the first mechanism discussed. Article
108(2) of the EEA Agreement calls for the EFTA Court to address:
"(a) actions concerning the surveillance procedure regarding the
EFTA states; (b) appeals concerning decisions in the field of competi-
tion taken by the EFTA Surveillance Authority; [and] (c) the settle-
ment of disputes between two or more EFTA States."1°6 Under
article 6, the EFTA Court will use the jurisprudence of the E.CJ.
prior to the date of signature of the Agreement, in the case of provi-
sions parallel to the EEC and ECSC Treaties, as well as secondary
legislation.
The Joint Committee will review the EFTA Court's decisions in
order to monitor their consistency with E.C.J. decisionsY° 7 As stated
earlier, the Joint Committee may also settle disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of the Agreement between the Commu-
nity and an EFTA state; in the event it fails to do so, safeguard meas-
ures may be taken, or the Agreement may be suspended.1' 8 If the
dispute concerns provisions "identical in substance to corresponding
rules" of the EEC or ECSC Treaties and their secondary legislation,
the contracting parties may agree to request a ruling from the
E.C.J.1°9 When the dispute concerns safeguard or rebalancing meas-
ures and the Joint Committee fails to resolve the issue, mandatory
arbitration will take place.11
Finally, EFTA states may in their discretion authorize their courts
to submit requests to the E.C.J. for decisions (not opinions or advice)
on the interpretation of provisions of the Agreement identical in sub-
stance to Community law."11 The European Court is no longer
obliged to pay "due account" to decisions of other courts, including
the EFTA Court."
2
106. Id. recital 4.
107. EEA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 105(2). Opinion 1/92, supra note 14, recital 6.
108. See EEA Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 111, 102.
109. Id. art. 111(3); Opinion 1/92, supra note 14, recitals 34, 35.
110. EEA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 111(4). See id. protocol 33; Opinion 1/92,
supra note 14, recital 36.
111. EEA Agreement, supra note 1, art. 107; id. protocol 34. See Opinion 1192, supra
note 14, recitals 11, 37.
112. Opinion 1/92, supra note 14, recital 16.
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The main objection to the EEA Agreement faced by the Court
was its incompatibility with the EEC Treaty, particularly EEC 'reaty
article 164. The powers of the Joint Committee, described above, to
review decisions of the E.C.J. could call the Court's autonomy into
question. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the Court decided that the
Agreed Minute in the proces-verbal concerning article 105 is a suffi-
cient safeguard.113 The link between article 105(3) and article 111,
whereby the Joint Committee may settle disputes brought by the
Community or an EFTA state, including differences in the EC and
EFTA Courts' case law, was deemed sufficient on the basis of the
proces-verbal concerning article 105, to remedy any incompatibility
with article 164 of the EEC Treaty.
114
The Court decided that its jurisdiction can be expanded by an
international agreement, "provided that in so doing it does not change
the nature of the function of the Court as conceived in the EEC
Treaty."' 15 The supremacy of the Court, because of the binding na-
ture of its decisions, is the heart of its function under article 164 of the
EEC Treaty, and the provisions of EEA Agreement Article 111 do
not challenge it, according to this Opinion.
1 6
The Court similarly deemed article 56 of the EEA Agreement
compatible with the EEC Treaty. Based upon its case law, 117 it de-
cided that "the Community is empowered, under the competition
rules in the EEC Treaty and measures implementing those rules, to
conclude international agreements in this field."118 Those agreements
may include the "sharing of respective competencies in the field of
competition, provided that those rules do not change the nature of the




The EFTA member states made concessions to the Commission
in the renegotiation of the EEA Agreement. First, they accepted the
EFTA Court rather than the proposed EEA Court. Second, they ac-
113. Id. recitals 22-25.
114. Id. recitals 26-30.
115. Id. recitals 31-33.
116. Id. recitals 34-37.
117. Id. recital 39. Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, 1971 E.C. R. 263; Joined Cases 3,
4 and 6/76, Kramer, 1976 E.C.R. 1279; Opinion 1/76, supra note 57, para. 3.
118. Opinion 1/92, supra note 14, recital 40.
119. Id. recital 41.
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cepted a merely consultative role in the Community's decision-making
procedures, despite the fact that those decisions will be enforceable in
their territory as secondary law. Several of those states see the EEA
as a step toward accession to the European Communities, therefore,
they are willing to sacrifice full participation at this stage, including
integrated adjudication. Others, however, particularly the citizenry of
Switzerland, have deemed the Agreement unacceptable.
The two opinions of the E.C.J. preserve the autonomy of the
Community's legal order, underlining its supra-constitutional nature
and the role of the Court in upholding it. The status of the EEA
Agreement as an international accord subject to the rules of public
international law should not be ignored, nor should it be forgotten
that the contracting parties are not transferring sovereign powers to
the EEA institutions, as the twelve member states have done in creat-
ing the European Communities.
Cooperation between the EC and EFTA is necessary for both or-
ganizations. Despite dissent, the EEA Agreement is likely to be the
vehicle for that cooperation in the not too distant future.
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